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Now that the first wave of the financial crisis has been resolved through the coordinated efforts 
of regulators and banks, it is important to address some of the systematic weaknesses of the 
current financial system. One such weakness is the inappropriate incentive effects of the market 
for credit derivatives, and in particular, for credit default swaps. As a risk management tool, 
credit derivatives were originally an effective means of diversifying lending risk. Credit 
derivatives have worked to cover exposures where there have been credit events of the 
underlying reference entities.   
 
However, as products proliferated in number and complexity, they have caused some negative 
consequences, increasing risk of losses for less sophisticated investors, creating excessive 
exposures for banks and other entities, and creating negative incentives in respect of financially 
distressed companies. In part, the risks arose because of the expansion to markets involving 
asset-backed commercial paper, residential mortgages, and other products where some of the 
underlying assets had been inappropriately valued or rated and thus risk mispriced. In part, these 
risks arose when derivatives became part of the “originate and distribute” model of lending; and 
in part, they arose from the speculative market for these products, which has shifted derivatives 
to some extent from their original risk diversification purposes.   
 
To date, the global market for derivatives has operated largely without regulatory oversight; yet 
it is increasingly evident that deficiencies in the market contributed, at least in part, to the 
liquidity crisis in the financial sector, resulting in massive injection of public funds in numerous 
jurisdictions.  As structural adjustments are being made to ensure long term financial stability, 
the credit derivative market needs timely, targeted, and effective adjustment, with a measure of 
regulatory oversight.  
 
Credit default swaps (CDS), by far the most common form of credit derivative, are illustrative. 
There are two critical points at which intervention is required. The first is at the purchase and 
sale stage, where there is a serious lack of transparency regarding both material adverse risks 
associated with the reference entity and material risk in respect of the protection seller’s ability 
to settle the CDS if a credit event occurs.  There is also a lack of due diligence and disclosure by 
those who are recommending CDS products to less sophisticated purchasers. Second, at the 
point of settlement and restructuring proceedings, there is a threat to current public policy goals 
of rehabilitating financially distressed businesses where they are viable, given structural and 
incentive effects for derivatives that are both physically and cash settled. The disconnection 
between economic interest and legal interest runs contrary to fundamental insolvency law 
principles adopted by numerous jurisdictions. In this respect, there needs to be a balancing of 
public law principles, those advancing the goals of insolvency law and those advancing the 
effective operation of capital markets.  At times they align, at others, they are in sharp 
disaccord. 
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This brief article addresses these two issues, offering ten recommendations for immediate 
action. More fundamentally, there needs to be public debate regarding the “casino” aspect of the 
current market for credit derivatives. 
 
 
Credit Derivatives, Distinguishing Risk Management Tool from Speculative Market 
 
Credit derivatives are financial instruments that allow parties to manage credit exposure. There 
are numerous kinds of credit derivatives, such as credit default swaps, collateralized debt 
obligations (CDO), full and index trades, and credit-linked notes. Credit derivatives are 
classified as either single or multi-name (basket) products. Single name credit derivatives are 
targeted on the credit worthiness of a single reference entity. Multi-name products hedge the 
risk of clustered defaults in a portfolio.2 A credit derivative can be a privately negotiated 
agreement that explicitly shifts credit risk from one party to the other; or it can be collateralized 
and housed within a special purpose vehicle that resells debt contracts in various tranches at 
differing prices, quality and risk. CDO can be cash flow based, whereby the vehicle issues its 
own financial instruments to finance purchase of debts of different corporate entities, ensuring a 
fixed flow of loan repayments that are used to pay investors in the various tranches; or CDO can 
be synthetic, whereby the entity does not directly purchase debts but rather, enters into credit 
default swaps with a third party, creating synthetic exposure to the debt of a number of 
corporate entities.3  
The  most common credit derivative, a credit default swap (CDS), is a credit derivative contract 
in which one party, the “protection buyer”, pays a sum of money periodically to the “protection 
seller”, usually referable to the amount of protection provided by the contract. The protection 
seller’s obligation to pay arises on the occurrence of a credit event, most frequently, the 
reference entity’s failure to pay, bankruptcy, or restructuring. The reference entity is not a party 
to the credit default swap. The protection buyer that is a creditor of the reference entity hedges 
the risk of default by that entity, and takes on the risk of default by the protection seller. The 
protection seller acquires the default risk of the reference entity. Unlike insurance, the amount 
of compensation that can be claimed under a credit derivative is not related to the actual losses 
suffered by the protection buyer.4 Credit derivatives do not require either the protection seller or 
protection buyer to actually hold an interest in the referenced asset; therefore the protection 
purchased by the protection buyer can be more than, less than, or completely unconnected to its 
underlying exposure to the reference entity.   
Credit derivatives emerged in the early 1990s as a tool for banks to manage their credit risk in 
respect of entities that they had directly invested in through their lending activities, diversifying 
their risk on loan default. In this respect, credit derivatives were initially effective in cushioning 
the commercial banks’ losses in notable cases such as Enron and Parmalat. The market grew in 
less than two decades to an estimated USD 62 trillion in CDS alone at the end of 2007.  During 
this period, three significant changes occurred in the market.  
 
First, the original objective of banks managing risk of direct investment under lending portfolios 
was overtaken by a speculative market for buying and selling derivatives in multiples of the 
value of the underlying reference assets or entities, resulting in a significant trading market 
involving a greater number of market participants. 
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3
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Second, global credit derivatives exposures by ratings shifted downward. In 2002, 36% of all 
credit derivatives globally were rated at AA or AAA, whereas only 8% were rated as below 
investment grade.  Just four years later, in 2006, only 17% of credit derivatives globally were 
rated at AA or AAA, whereas 31% were now rated as below investment grade.5 Counterparty 
risk was heavily concentrated among the top 20 global banks and broker dealers, including Bear 
Sterns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Merrill Lynch and Royal Bank of Scotland.6 
 
Third, the banks’ market share declined as hedge funds increasingly took a greater share of both 
the buy side and sell side of the market. In 2000, banks accounted 81% of the buy side and 63% 
of the sell side of market share, that number dropping to 59% and 44% respectively by 2006.  
Hedge funds went from 3% of the market on the buy side in 2000 to 28% market share in 2006.  
As a seller, their market share grew from 5% to 32% market share in the same period.7 Those 
derivatives were then hedged in further credit derivatives in multiples of the value of the 
originating reference entities. The hedge funds were a major driver of change in the market. The 
reasons for move down the credit curve included tight spreads; as margins squeezed at the upper 
end of the credit curve, to maintain returns, investors shifted to more speculative investment 
grades and unrated exposures.  
 
Together, these changes altered the credit derivatives market significantly, without any 
jurisdiction seriously assessing the public policy implications. Market participants now have 
varying reasons for involvement in the credit derivatives market, often on both the buy and sell 
side. Protection buyers may use credit derivatives to manage portfolio uncertainties, including to 
hedge over concentrations in loan portfolios, free up economic or regulatory capital, and avoid 
sales of bond holdings.  Protection sellers may be in the market to increase exposure to sectors, 
diversify investment portfolios, enhance relative value of trades, exploit yield alternatives, and 
provide capital arbitrage.8 As a risk management tool, CDS could continue to be effective, with 
some adjustment to the market.  As a speculative market product, there needs to be a more 
fundamental regulatory shift, given the social and economic harm they can cause.  
 
While the appeal of CDS is ostensibly that they can be tailored to the individual contract, the 
reality is that most are now off-the-shelf standardized products with industry wide standard 
terms developed by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), with tuning 
primarily in respect of the reference entity and only a few business terms.9 Most credit 
derivative transactions, including most CDS, are not funded, but may be subject to margin and 
collateral arrangements depending on the counterparty. The ISDA standard form CDS is silent 
on obligations of the protection buyer regarding its knowledge of material adverse information 
in regard to the reference entity.  
 
Although there is some jurisdictional lack of clarity, derivatives have been found to be covered 
by financial services or securities legislation where they trade in public markets in some 
jurisdictions, but had been often viewed by regulators as part of the exempt market, assuming 
sophistication of parties. Other jurisdictions, such as the US and its Securities and Exchange 
Commission, do not have any regulatory control over CDS or other swaps.10  In the absence of 
regulatory oversight, courts have generally looked to the wording of the derivative contract or 
industry standards, creating considerable incentives for parties to dispute the meaning of 
contract terms when a credit event occurs.11  
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9
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 Except under anti-fraud powers where they are considered securities.  SEC Chair Christopher Cox, 
presentation to the US Senate Banking Committee, 23 September 2008; Securities Exchange Act 1934, 15 
U.S.C. 78.   
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Hedge funds and other derivatives traders have engaged in market trading that speculated 
heavily on the reference entity’s risk. The reselling of that risk, in tranches that moved 
progressively down the rating scale, to purchasers with little or no information of the underlying 
risk of the derivative, created a serious disconnect between the value of the reference entity and 
its assets and the derivatives written on them. There is asymmetry of information between the 
knowledge of risk of the originating lender and the credit risk transferred to subsequent 
investors because there is no obligation to disclose material adverse risk on either the buy or sell 
side of protection.  
 
Many outstanding derivative contracts can aggregate five to ten times the amount of creditor 
claims.12 For example, the insolvency of Delphi in the US revealed that there was USD 25 
billion in outstanding credit derivatives on USD 2 billion of Delphi bonds. While the liquidity of 
the products assisted in hedging risk in a number of instances, the CDS evolved from being a 
risk management tool to a primarily credit trading tool and the volume of CDS trades began to 
outpace the outstanding bond issuance of that credit. Hence CDS outstanding were greater by 
multiples than the volume of bonds. Where there was a requirement for physical settlement on 
occurrence of a credit event, protection buyers would have to go to the open market to source 
bonds.13 When the financial markets began to seriously deteriorate, the CDS exposures of 
counterparties began to become clear, creating a major crisis in the ability of protection sellers 
to ensure coverage.  One immediate cause of the AIG Insurance liquidity crisis, for example, 
was a requirement that its financial products subsidiary post additional cash collateral on its 
outstanding CDS obligations due to its over-exposure.14 At the point of the US government 
bailout, AIG had outstanding more than USD 446 billion of CDS liabilities. 
Equally significant, protection buyers are relying on the financial viability of the protection 
seller so that their claims can be met at the point of a credit event in respect of the reference 
entity, yet there is no disclosure required by the protection seller of its capacity to settle the 
derivatives if the specified credit event occurs. In this respect, credit derivatives differ from 
other bilateral contracts where the credit worthiness of a counterparty is typically dealt with 
through negotiated credit controls, including collateral requirements, covenants, representations 
and warranties, and the oversight of a credit officer. In order to facilitate their liquidity, many 
such terms are not negotiated in CDS and there is a lack of oversight. The ISDA has observed 
that swaps and related OTC derivatives combine characteristics of loans with those of traded 
capital market instruments; the swap transaction creates a credit relationship between the 
counterparties, the terms of which are documented just as the terms of a traditional loan, but 
unlike a loan, swaps are traded in the market and renegotiation of credit terms for each 
transaction would be costly in a system of repeated interaction between counterparties, creating 
a drag on trading activity.15 Consequently, the ISDA Master Agreement contains the ‘non-
economic’ terms such as representations and warranties, events of default, and termination 
events, leaving counterparties to negotiate only the ‘economic’ terms such as rate or price, 
notional amount, and collateral.16  
While standardization of terms in derivatives can reduce transaction costs and create a more 
liquid market for derivatives, the standardized terms have been developed by industry 
participants, arguably with their own interests in mind. Proprietary and confidentiality 
agreements mean that there is little public exposure to, or debate regarding, the risks and 
benefits associated with the terms. Standards developed solely though the participation of a 
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 Murphy, Sarra and Creber, supra, note 2. 
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 ISDA, supra, note 3. Professor Michael Mainelli has observed that “slicing and dicing tranches” led to 
abnormal bucket distributions and greater sensitivity to rating changes, email correspondence with the 
author, 10 October 2008. 
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 AIG Insurance was required to begin to book billions of dollars of losses as the risk exposure on CDS 
sold by it rose in price with the deteriorating credit position of the reference entities. 
15
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16
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netting. 
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small number of industry participants can lead to further information asymmetries, collective 
action problems for end-purchasers of derivatives, and arguably, risk of self-dealing conduct by 
those setting the standards.  To date, the judiciary in Canada and elsewhere have simply 
deferred unquestioningly to industry set standards because of the lack of counterparties with the 
information, skill or resources to argue that the standards may not always be the appropriate 
measure of parties’ agreed upon risk.  
Credit derivatives also pose challenges for regulatory oversight in some jurisdictions such as the 
European Union (EU), where insider trading prohibitions are considerably robust.17 The EU 
Joint Market Practices Forum has published recommendations for the handling of material non-
public information by credit market participants, including recommending that prohibitions on 
insider dealing should apply to dealings in any credit derivative whose value depends on a 
publicly–traded security.18 The Forum sought to maintain compliance with the principles of the 
EU’s Market Abuse Directive, suggesting that lenders that hedge credit risk by purchasing CDS 
referencing their borrowers may possess material non-public information and may be found 
subject to a duty of trust and confidence owed to their borrower.19 As with other financial 
services markets, failure to disclose material adverse risk can affect the credibility of the 
derivatives market, and arguably, the creation of standards to require such disclosure in the 
credit derivative market would assist in preventing some aspects of the current financial 
instability.  
 
Arguably, there are two significant aspects of the credit derivatives market that require 
immediate attention.  The first is how to address the principal-agency problems generated by the 
disconnection between legal interest and economic interest.  The second is how to address the 





There are significant agency issues that have arisen with respect to credit derivatives. First, there 
are inappropriate incentives created by the use of CDS in multiple values of the original debt. 
Traditionally, a creditor’s interest in a debtor company was to receive return of its capital plus 
interest and fees, often premised on encouraging an ongoing credit relationship with the 
business enterprise. The introduction of CDS in some instances has created a misalignment 
between the creditor’s and debtor’s interests. A creditor can lend an amount to a debtor 
company and then purchase CDS many times the value of the underlying reference asset or 
entity. Thus the creditor has an incentive to have the debtor company fail, triggering a credit 
event in which the value to the creditor from settlement of the CDS is greater than repayment of 
the loan. If the creditor is a senior lender, it may be able to precipitate the credit event. Some of 
the previous willingness by lenders to not enforce covenants for a limited period in order to 
allow a debtor time to devise a business plan may be less likely now that the lender is not only 
fully hedged, but over hedged.20 
 
Second, there are agency issues between tranches of creditors under originate and distribute 
lending. Securitization of debt through CDOs and other derivatives creates incentives for the 
                                                                   
17
 Joint Market Practices Forum, Statement of Principles and Recommendations regarding the Handling of 
Material Non-Public Information by Credit Market Participants, European Supplement, 2005. Henry Hu 
and Bernard Black, “Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling; Governance and Systemic Risk Implications”, 
forthcoming 2008 European Financial Management 17 at 1 briefly discuss insider trading and cross-market 
manipulations, citing Acharya and Johnson, 2007 in respect of evidence of insider trading in debt 
derivatives. 
18




 Hu and Black, supra, note 17. They call this over-hedging of debt “negative economic ownership”. They 
observe that there can also be “hybrid” decoupling, whereby investors short their shares, buying protection 
with credit default swaps or use a long equity position to hedge a short debt position, ibid. at 2, at 19. 
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originating lender not to be duly diligent in its lending decisions, as it can offload the risk to the 
purchasers of various tranches of the debt.21  Under this model, there are few incentives for the 
originating lender to exact protective covenants or undertake monitor on an ongoing basis, given 
that risk of default is borne by other parties.  Over multiple similar transactions, these 
disincentives can cause a market crisis.  For derivatives markets to function effectively, the 
incentives of originators should be better aligned with those of end purchasers.  A third agency 
issue is with respect to incentives in insolvency restructuring proceedings, discussed below. 
 
These incentives shift credit decisions away from the merits of a company’s business plan and 
create risks for less senior creditors. One option to address the issue would be to require that a 
proportion of the exposure be left on the originating lender’s balance sheet or that a seasoning 
period be required before the debt can be sold. Such requirements could address some of the 
immediate agency issues associated with the speculative market. 
 
There is another agency aspect of the credit derivatives market, in particular, in respect of 
synthetic derivatives, which needs to be addressed.  There have been problems with the credit 
ratings associated with such products, an issue that deserves considerably more attention than 
possible here. In brief, however, there are at least two potential explanations. The first is that 
credit rating agencies developed inadequate valuation methods to assess these products, valuing 
the debt in various tranches higher than the cost of the underlying asset, making them attractive 
to sellers, but creating new counterparty risks, or that the agencies accepted the methodology 
developed by investment banks structuring CDOs without separate assessment. The other 
explanation is the “regulatory license” explanation offered by Professor Partnoy, specifically, 
that credit rating agencies serve as gate-openers rather than gatekeepers by virtue of their 
privileged status under US banking and securities regulation, whereby rating agencies actively 
promote synthetic derivatives in a conflict of interest situation as their fees come from those that 
they are rating, and those entities have no real choice of rating agency, given the closed market 
created by regulators.22  Partnoy suggests that in turn, there has been no incentive to properly 
value the products, and parties have paid substantial fees for highly dubious ratings. Professor 
Mainelli would resolve that problem by requiring indemnification by parties promoting 
products, using liability risk as the motivating factor in enhancing market transparency.23 Since 
credit rating agencies are paid by the banks or other entities issuing derivatives, either they 
should be required to disclose the fees they are receiving for the ratings, including any 
additional consulting fees from the same entity, or there should be a prohibition on payment for 
ratings.24  On a more fundamental basis, there is a public policy question as to whether credit 
ratings are the appropriate vehicle to control risk. Credit rating agency incentives must be 
aligned more closely with those of derivatives purchasers as investors.25  
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 The subprime mortgage lending in the US and consequent crisis is an example of this agency problem. 
22
 Frank Partnoy, “How and Why Credit Rating Agencies are Not Like Other Gatekeepers”, May 2006, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=900257. See also M. Zelmer, "Reforming the Credit-Rating Process," Financial 
System Review 51 (Ottawa: Bank of Canada, December 2007). 
23
 Michael Mainelli, “Standards Markets? The Free Market Response to Regulation”, 16 October 2006, 
http://www.gresham.ac.uk/event.asp?EventId=513&PageId=108   
24
 Michael Mainelli, "Assessing Credit Rating Agencies: Quis Aestimat Ipsos Aestimatores?", Balance 
Sheet, The Michael Mainelli Column, Volume 11, Number 3, pages 55-58, MCB University Press (August 
2003); http://www.zyen.com/Knowledge/Articles/Balance%20Sheet%200803.pdf. 
25
 Mainelli, supra, note 23, would encourage an open standard available to all market participants, with 
standards markets that would use innovative regulation to achieve multiple societal goals and allow 
competition for certification, in turn encouraging rational interpretation of the standard, control of costs, 
and enhanced quality through reputational risk and competition. He suggests that a single regulator or self 
regulatory agency could have oversight over accreditation of such certifying entities as the quality control 
mechanism. 





Historically, there were positive externalities associated with commercial bank lending.26 Banks 
assisted in correcting governance problems of firms, such as managerial slack, through their 
monitoring activities, given their superior access to information under loan covenants, and 
through direct intervention with corporate officers or exiting the relationship, signalling to other 
creditors that there were problems with the debtor company.27  Stakeholders benefited from the 
bank's governance role in this respect. A fundamental assumption underlying this theory of 
interactive corporate governance, developed by Professors Triantis and Daniels, was that all 
stakeholders shared the goal of firm-value maximization.28 The positive externality for corporate 
stakeholders was that they could be confident that the bank was engaged in a measure of 
monitoring and oversight of the firm’s solvency, an important benefit for trade suppliers, 
employees and others that did not have the bargaining power to extract disclosure and default 
control rights. To the extent that the bank's monitoring deterred debtor misconduct or shirking, it 
reduced the risk on all the firm's debt.29  For companies that relied increasingly on the public 
debt markets, while the indenture trustee often had limited responsibility to monitor compliance, 
issuers frequently were required to back their commercial paper with lines of credit from banks, 
with the banks serving a similar governance role.30   
  
Hence, the screening and monitoring activities of a lender produced externalities that benefited 
numerous stakeholders with an interest in the corporation, through the bank’s decision to lend, 
which signalled to potential and existing stakeholders the quality of the borrower; through the 
imposition of fixed obligations under the loan agreement that prevented managerial slack; 
through security rights that constrained the ability of managers to liquidate non-cash assets or 
unilaterally sell more debt; and through loan covenants and monitoring of specified prohibited 
types of behaviour.31 Triantis and Daniels called this feature “interdependent screening” to 
describe externalities that flow not only among creditors, but also from lenders to shareholders, 
employees and other stakeholders.32 
 
The exponential growth in use of credit derivatives has shifted the externalities in a way that 
may contribute to market destabilization.  First, the disconnection between economic interest 
and residual control rights can create new incentives, in that originating lenders may be less 
willing to expend the time and resources to undertake due diligence in undertaking credit 
arrangements, as risk is laid off through derivatives under the originate and distribute model. 
Hence the signalling to the market that occurred with the decision to lend is no longer reliable as 
a measure of the firm’s value.  Second, in the purchase and sale of credit derivatives, parties 
have frequently given up the negotiation of terms and conditions, including monitoring, 
restrictive covenants and default control rights, because they know that they will offset their 
own risk through other structured financial products. Hence that prior positive externality maybe 
lost as senior creditors no longer undertake monitoring and strategic intervention.  When the 
firm begins to slide into financial distress, corporate stakeholders no longer share a common 
goal of maximizing firm value and constraining managerial slack because the originating lender 
                                                                   
26
 Externalities occur when an economic activity causes an external benefit or cost to third party 
stakeholders that were not directly involved in the transaction. 
27
 George C. Triantis and Ronald Daniels.  "The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance" (1995) 
University of California Law Review 83, 1073-1113.  
28




 Ibid. at 1084, 1088-1089. 
31
 Ibid. at 1079. 
32
 Triantis and Daniels observe that a “bank's choice between exit and voice is based on a self-interested 
evaluation of the relative net benefits from each option. A bank that exits enjoys the benefit of a more 
certain recovery of its investment. However, it bears transaction and regulatory costs of exit, incurs search 
and transaction costs in entering into new lending arrangements, and may forgo the opportunity to finance 
a revitalized borrower in the future. In addition, bank management may be reluctant to abandon a sunk 
investment, even if a prospective cost-benefit calculation favors exit.” Ibid. at 1084.   
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has hedged its risk through its derivatives, and multiple subsequent counterparties have done the 
same.  Stakeholders that could previously rely on the governance role of banks can no longer do 
so; yet given the diverse nature of their interests, information asymmetries and collective action 
problems, they are unlikely to be able to fill this governance gap.   
 
This shift in how parties purchase and sell debt may not be significant for a single swap 
transaction, but multiplied many times through complex derivative transactions and multiple 
swaps, previous positive externalities are lost and new negative externalities are created, 
creating more systemic risks across the market.  The move to standardize derivatives contracts, 
while arguably efficient in terms of controlling transaction costs, may exacerbate this risk 
through the reduction or elimination of debt governance covenants. Moreover, the signalling 
that occurred through exit or other creditor reactions to the debtor’s decisions is diminished 
because banks and other significant lenders may be fully hedged. Yet that fact is not transparent 
to other stakeholders, who may still look for such signalling. Given the global nature of credit 
derivatives, the externalities may create systemic problems that require more broad based 
intervention than merely improving disclosure. 
 
There may be additional externalities. Hu and Black have observed that when credit derivatives 
impede the normal negotiations between creditors and debtors in that borrowers can less easily 
renegotiate terms and conditions with lenders, there is heavier reliance on liquidity and the 
ability to refinance.33 Spread across the economy, the freezing of such relationships may 
increase systemic financial risk as it increases the economy’s exposure to liquidity shocks.34  
 
What targeted intervention in the credit derivatives market might look like is difficult to discern.  
Imposition of some sort of fiduciary obligation on either one or both counterparties presents 
formidable challenges in determining what the scope of such an obligation would entail and 
how it would be enforced, particularly when end purchasers are widely dispersed and face 
serious collective action problems. If one restricts the supply of derivatives products, the 
products will simply relocate to other jurisdictions, given their high degree of mobility. 
Increased transparency is one necessary measure; however, enhancing disclosure alone does not 
ensure that purchasers can properly interpret the information, nor does it assist in offering 
remedies for misconduct.  
 
One possible way to compensate for potential negative externalities is to set a price for 
participation in the market.  For example, one could tax credit derivatives on a per transaction 
basis.35 A small amount on each transaction could be placed in a central trust fund in the 
domestic jurisdiction in which the credit derivative is being purchased. That fund would be 
available to counterparties that had been unfairly harmed by failure to disclose or other 
misconduct by market participants, or could be restricted to payments during financial crises.  
Not unlike deposit insurance funds or pension guarantee funds, the fund would be available, to 
some specified cap, to cushion such losses. The fund could possibly be empowered to then 
impose risked-based levies on the counterparties causing the losses, in an attempt to partially 
recover where the counterparty was solvent.  On insolvency, such a claim by the fund would be 
eligible for debt to equity conversion along with other creditors’ claims. Such a strategy would 
spread the cost of misconduct across parties most actively buying and selling CDS and other 
derivatives, would allow cost recovery against specific counterparties in some cases, and would 
diminish the risk of unfair losses to end purchasers. 
 
There are two further public policy issues that need consideration, but which are beyond the 
scope of this discussion. The first is how mark-to-market accounting has influenced and been 
influenced by the credit derivatives market and whether or not it should be adjusted to account 




 Hu and Black, supra, note 17 at 2. 
35
 The author thanks Eric Talley, Professor of Law at Berkeley and Visiting Lecturer, Harvard Law School 
for suggesting a tax. 
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for current financial uncertainty.36 Mark-to-market accounting requires that asset price shocks 
be reflected on balance sheets, creating their own shocks and raising the question of whether 
market prices appropriately reflect economic value or whether this approach fosters greater 
uncertainty for investors.37  Second, there should be public policy discussion as to whether any 
regulatory intervention should distinguish between sophisticated and less sophisticated 
derivatives market participants. Arguably, more sophisticated purchasers can price risk in future 
derivatives agreements or bargain particular governance and monitoring controls. If so, perhaps 
regulation needs to focus on ensuring that risk moves to those parties that have the capacity for 
such risk bearing, protecting the more vulnerable market participants. 
 
Some ideas for addressing problems in the credit derivatives market are innovative and far 
reaching, requiring broad-based public discussion that allows for measured and effective change 
to be developed, which can be generally endorsed by multiple jurisdictions. Some changes 
require regulatory intervention, others not; hence public policy discussion is required to assist in 
making those determinations.  In the interim, some initial steps could be taken to enhance the 
fairness of the credit derivatives market, in turn increasing the sustainability of financial 
markets, while dampening the negative speculative aspects of the market. While these steps 
alone would not have prevented the market meltdown, they could have mitigated the degree of 
harm to end purchasers. Aspects of the derivatives market resemble a securities market more 
than a traditional loan relationship, and disclosure reduces information asymmetries and risks 
associated with the inability to negotiate covenants and other protections.  A few initial changes 
could facilitate the appropriate analysis and pricing of risk.  As a general principle, regulation 
should be principles-based and outcomes focused, intervening where the market itself has failed 
to adequately produce standards of fairness, transparency or sustainability. There needs to be 
space to develop alternate standards or approaches where there is a problem identified in the 
market, and the current structure does not allow for full consideration of the public policy 
implications of changes made by the industry.  
 
Recommendations for point of purchase and sale: 
 
1. Information asymmetries in the OTC market must be reduced through disclosure 
requirements that are targeted, and measured against potential outcomes. The underlying 
principle is that there must be sufficient disclosure of material information to allow market 
participants to make informed choices about credit derivative investment.    
 
i. Protection buyers could be required to disclose, at the time of purchase, any material 
adverse risk in the reference entity that they are aware of or ought reasonably to be 
aware of, in order that protection sellers can appropriately price the contract. 
Materiality in this respect could be based on a standard of whether the facts in respect 
of the adverse risk reasonably would be expected to have a significant effect on the 
protection seller’s valuation or pricing of the derivative.  
 
ii. Protection sellers could be required to disclose any material adverse risk to their 
financial health at the time of the sale and/or renewal of a derivative contract, and 
                                                                   
36
 Under current mark-to-market, some long term investors face pressure to sell their CDS because of short 
term funding requirements.  The opacity of structured financial products has made them harder to value, 
thus negatively affecting secondary market liquidity.  See J. Sarra, “Restructuring of the Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper Market in Canada”, Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2008 (forthcoming, Toronto: 
Thomson Reuters, 2009).  Essentially, by reflecting market moves, fair value accounting increases the 
volatility of reported earnings. Arguably, officers’ incentives to realize mark-to-market losses are also 
influenced by the extent to which their investors will reward or negatively sanction them for how they 
value downside risk. 
37
 The Financial Stability Forum is examining accounting and valuation procedures for financial derivative 
instruments that are difficult to price in times of market stress. Current accounting rules do not allow 
valuation to be expressed as a range of potential outcomes, yet allowing such disclosure could offer greater 
information to market participants; http://www.fsforum.org. 
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could have an ongoing disclosure requirement regarding material adverse change to 
their ability to settle the derivative at the point of a credit event occurring. 
 
iii. Publicly traded companies could be required to disclose the effect of credit derivatives 
on their risk exposure, including how their credit risk has affected valuation of 
derivative liabilities and any resulting gain or loss included in earnings statements, and 
any known information on how counterparty credit risk may have affected their 
valuation of, or ability to collect on, derivative assets. While some jurisdictions may 
now require such disclosure as part of their financial services requirements, it should 
be more broadly and consistently available. 
 
The outcome sought by this recommendation is to reduce the potential for unnecessary and 
unfair financial loss for market participants through greater transparency regarding material risk. 
It would require plain and timely disclosure of such information to retail and other purchasers as 
an investor protection measure. In essence, it is a principle or standard, with the mechanics of 
how that disclosure is to occur left to market participants to develop. 
 
2. Financial institutions and other parties that create new tranches of derivatives must disclose 
underlying material risks to the derivatives to counterparties.  Counterparties and retail 
investors purchasing derivatives should have enforceable remedies for the failure of these 
entities and individuals to disclose material adverse risks at the point of sale of the 
derivatives. Materiality could be based on a standard of whether the facts in respect of the 
adverse risk reasonably would be expected to have a significant effect on the potential 
counterparty or retail investor’s valuation or pricing of the derivative.  
 
The outcome sought is to ensure that a standard of greater transparency is applicable to new 
products as they develop, allowing for market innovation while trying both to ensure that there 
is sufficient information in the market to assess and price risk, and ensure that those making the 
products available are providing a type of indemnification in respect of the product in terms of 
assurances that the material adverse risks are known by the counterparties at the time of sale. 
 
3. Credit rating and other entities that recommend investment in derivatives should meet a due 
diligence standard in examining and disclosing material adverse risk in the derivative 
products being sold in the public market.  
 
i. Credit rating agencies should be required to disclose all fees associated with a rating, as 
well as consulting and other fees received from the bank or other entity selling the 
derivatives. 
 
ii. There should be effective remedies for purchasers and other market participants from 
failure of those individuals and entities recommending or rating derivatives to meet due 
diligence and disclosure obligations. 
 
The outcome sought is to create appropriate incentives for credit rating agencies and others that 
recommend investment in credit derivatives to undertake diligent examination and assessment 
of products, including ascertaining and disclosing material risk, and to reduce their conflicts of 
interest. 
 
4. Any central exchange and/or counterparty clearing facility that is being created needs to be 
subject to regulatory oversight, and work towards standardized transparent trading 
procedures, consistent standards of conduct and disclosure, and transparency in the valuing 
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and settlement of derivatives.  The purpose of an exchange or clearing facility would be to 
manage systemic risks to the derivatives market.38 
 
i. Credit derivatives documentation should be made public, either through a common 
database of trading information, a central registry or public disclosure vehicle similar 
to SEDAR in Canada or exchange disclosure requirements in UK and elsewhere. 
 
ii. There should be public reporting of credit default swaps, including trading and position 
reporting by OTC dealers and credit default swap clearing data. 
 
iii. There should be consideration of a requirement that a portion of exposure be left on the 
originating lender’s balance sheet or that the debt require seasoning for a period of time 
before it can be repackaged and resold. 
 
iv. Best practices standards must be developed for OTC derivatives through collaboration 
between regulators and market participants, including in respect of counterparty credit 
risk management, oversight, liquidity management and netting.  
 
The outcome sought is to reduce counterparty risk, increase transparency in the market, and 
move towards creation of shared definitions of derivatives terms and shared standards and 
overarching principles, given the global nature of the market. The development of standards 
could be state or market driven, although there are risks inherent in both strategies, and a hybrid 
of the two may be most effective.  The market is able to more quickly adapt standards and 
measurement of risk to new product developments, but solely industry-dominated standard 
setting failed recently to adequately assess risk, and in the future may create somewhat self-
serving standards given the closed nature of the industry.  Current initiatives by industry 
participants could be enhanced by participation of regulatory authorities and investor protection 
or other NGOs, in order to ensure public interest concerns are included in the development of 
standards.   
 
5. Regulators should consider requiring public disclosure of “no economic interest at risk” 
derivatives and prohibiting actions by these derivatives holders that lead to default events, 
in order to address the moral hazard issues of financial products imperilling the real 
economy.  
 
The outcome sought by this recommendation is to reduce incentives for those holding 
derivatives products to engage in actions that precipitate credit events where they have no 
economic interest at risk. Many insurance statutes require the insured have at least a factual 
expectation of loss if the object of the insurance suffers pecuniary damage, loss or destruction; 
and the factual expectation requires a lawful or substantial economic interest in the preservation 
of the insured property. The same approach should be considered for credit derivatives in terms 
of requiring that a creditor that has hedged its claims through a derivative discloses the real 
quantum and nature of its remaining economic interest, if any, before it has decision or control 
rights in proceedings involving the reference entity.  
 
 
Financial Distress of the Reference Entity and Implications for Restructuring 
 
Globally, in the past decade, jurisdictions have been moving their insolvency law systems 
towards rehabilitation of financially distressed companies, adopting restructuring regimes that 
allow for the development of viable business plans that maximize enterprise value, preserve 
economic activity and save jobs. The premise is that there is frequently value lost when 
                                                                   
38
 Not unlike futures exchanges, standard portfolios could be defined through pools of various types of 
assets and derivatives contracts could then be defined relative to such portfolios and traded on the 
exchange, creating one measure of investor protection. 
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businesses are liquidated prematurely. All insolvency systems are premised on the notion that 
creditors with claims should be the ultimate decision makers as to whether a financially troubled 
company restructures, as they are the parties with the real economic interest in the entity. Hence 
most restructuring law facilitates negotiations between debtor companies and their creditors 
with a view to maximizing firm value. A number of jurisdictions also place considerable value 
on the public interest associated with restructuring debtor companies, with the concomitant 
benefits to suppliers, employees and other stakeholders and to economic activity more 
generally.  However, the existence of credit derivatives may perversely affect the motivation 
and behaviour of stakeholders of a financially distressed entity, and may cause greater 
complexity and uncertainty in a restructuring proceeding, as the real economic interests of 
claimants are not transparent.   
 
Commercial banks as operating lenders traditionally had a strong role in monitoring the 
financial status of debtor companies, particularly in the period leading up to insolvency. 
However, their hedging of risk through derivatives has reduced the incentive to engage in 
oversight and monitoring, notwithstanding that they are best placed through loan covenants, 
access to information and in-house resources to engage in that monitoring.  While arguably that 
managing of risk freed up capital for other market participants seeking to borrow, the previous 
reliance that creditors and other market participants often had on banks to engage in such 
monitoring and the resultant signalling of a firm’s financial health, have diminished 
considerably.  Given the weaker covenants under which some debtor companies have financed 
their operations in recent years because operating lenders were hedging risk through derivatives 
rather than rigorous covenants, creditors may be unable to assert control over a debtor until 
there has been a significant deterioration in its financial position, leading to deferred liquidation 
or restructuring and consequent lower recovery to creditors. It may no longer be feasible for the 
bank or other traditional operating lender to take a lead in restructuring negotiations, given that 
they have little or no remaining economic interest due to their credit default swaps.  
 
On insolvency, one moral hazard is that a creditor that has material holdings of credit 
derivatives may have economic interests that potentially encourage it to cause a default to occur 
so that there is a credit event.39 There are many factors that can affect the motivation and 
behaviour of stakeholders in an insolvency restructuring, given their economic interests; yet the 
creditor that has hedged its risk through a credit derivative is arguably in a different position in 
the restructuring proceeding, as there is a lack of transparency in respect of whether in fact there 
are economic interests at risk.  This observation is not to suggest that credit derivatives drive 
behaviour in all cases; rather, it is a growing phenomenon with the move to cash settlements and 
growth of the market. 
 
Under physical settlement of a CDS, the single institution from which a debtor company 
borrowed and believed it had a relationship results now in multiplicity of intermediaries and 
counterparties as CDS settle. The insolvent company may not even appreciate before 
commencing a restructuring proceeding that it is a reference entity.  Cascading swaps means 
multiple rapid changes to who holds the claim, making it difficult for a debtor company to 
establish who has a claim.  It can suddenly be dealing with literally hundreds of new claimants. 
Given settlement time lags where the protection seller with each physical settlement becomes 
the party at the restructuring bargaining table, the company’s ability to devise a viable business 
plan can be hindered, particularly problematic if there is urgency in devising a plan because of a 
liquidity crisis or the need to maintain customer goodwill.  Physical settlement of multiple CDS 
has the potential to cause a revolving door effect, making it hard for the company to build 
consensus and garner requisite support of creditors for a going forward viable business 
restructuring plan.   
 
                                                                   
39
 This observation is not to lose sight of the fact that in a cash settlement, the protection buyer still has 
whatever it paid for the protection “at risk” in the insolvency proceeding. 
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A number of jurisdictions have granted exemptions for derivatives from stays under insolvency 
laws because of the important public policy goal of global financial stability. However, the 
continued trading of derivatives in cases where settlement is based on the debtor’s insolvency or 
filing of restructuring proceedings can cause further financial instability of the market in the 
name of preserving liquidity and makes restructuring increasingly difficult for particular 
debtors. In this respect, there is a tension between two broader public policy goals. On the one 
hand, Basel II capital rules require the ability to terminate, net and realize on collateral in order 
to allow institutions to take offsetting transactions into account for capital purposes.40 If parties 
cannot close out, they face exposure on their off-setting trades, which can cause greater 
financial problems in the market. On the other hand, the move towards rehabilitation in 
insolvency laws globally is driven by the recognition that liquidation can often leave value on 
the table that would have meant greater realizations for subordinated secured creditors, 
unsecured creditors and employees, as well as positive ripple effects in the local economy that 
can be realized by preservation of economic activity in the community.  Both are important 
public policy goals and both require consideration in devising a going forward structure of the 
market.  
 
Many restructurings are substantially negotiated before any formal proceedings are taken, the 
UK being one such jurisdiction where this practice occurs. Yet creditors who may be obliged to 
assign their claims to protection sellers may not be able to bind their claims to an agreed 
restructuring plan, removing a valuable public policy tool to preserve economic activity. 
 
Cash settlement of CDS poses different kinds of challenges for restructuring. Unlike insurance, 
no title to the claim passes and there is no right of subrogation. With cash settlement, the 
protection buyer that is a creditor of the insolvent company continues to be the party with the 
legal claim, although at a reduced or eliminated financial exposure.41 The debtor and other 
creditors have no notice or knowledge of the reduced exposure.  If the creditor is fully hedged, 
there will be little incentive to engage in constructive negotiations for a restructuring plan.  This 
level of disengagement may be problematic for the restructuring.  While in some cases, there 
can be an active market for derivatives during a restructuring where credit derivatives holders 
are also direct creditors and take an active and constructive role in workout negotiations, the 
converse can also occur. The financial institution with which the debtor company has had an 
operating lending relationship may be less interested in advancing further credit in form of post 
commencement or exit financing if it has no ongoing financial interest in the debtor. The 
creditor may actually have over-coverage and thus a negative economic interest, materially 
benefitting if the restructuring fails. Yet parties to the restructuring currently have no 
information on the economic interest held by those parties hedged through a credit derivative.   
 
Accordingly, a debtor company may find the creditor that is hedged under a CDS adamant in its 
refusal to agree to amendments to its credit arrangement such as a payment change or deferral 
and changes to covenants that would otherwise trigger a default or obligation acceleration. In 
addition, protection buying creditors will be unlikely to consent to the extension of the maturity 
date beyond the protection period unless a credit event has already occurred or the extension 
itself qualifies as a credit event.42  These motivations may complicate the efforts of distressed 
companies to negotiate arrangements with their creditors at the early stages of distress in an 
attempt to restructure outside of formal insolvency proceedings.  Moreover, a claims trader 
creditor may be seen as having a new, speculative and short term interest in the debtor. Having 
acquired its position when the debtor company is already in financial difficulty, it is often 
                                                                   
40
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards: a Revised Framework, June 2004, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm (Basel II). 
41
 Where there are cash settled credit default swaps, on occurrence of a credit event, the CDS may be 
settled by determining the value of the underlying debt instrument through an ISDA-run or similar auction, 
whereby the protection seller pays the protection buyer for its estimated loss based on the value established 
in the auction or where a value can be determined based on post credit event bids for the debt product. 
42
 In order that they can realize on the value of the CDS. 
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hedging against the speculative outcome of restructuring process. Such a creditor, perhaps 
holding a deciding vote, has little interest in the long term viability of the company. 
 
Moreover, the normative justification for carving out derivatives from stays under restructuring 
proceedings is unclear, given the shift from their risk management function to speculative 
product.  It creates a statutory preference for particular creditors over the claims of traditional 
secured creditors, employees, trade suppliers, and tort claimants. Considering the general 
insolvency law goals of transparency, timeliness, and certainty, such exclusion must be 
revisited.  As the bailouts of recent weeks have illustrated, there is a broader public interest in 
how the global derivatives market is to operate effectively, and adjustments to the system must 
be made after public policy discussion among stakeholders broader than industry participants. 
Interests affected are beyond capital markets participants, and regulation is needed to ensure that 
there is transparency in the nature of economic exposure and underlying risk. There should be a 
public policy debate on whether there is a need to design new principles to account for the 
separation of economic and legal interest in context of insolvency proceedings.  
 
These observations are not to suggest that the market has failed to address some of its flaws 
itself.  CDS protocols and index auctions have helpfully assisted in facilitating cash settlements.  
The purpose of such protocols is to offer market participants an efficient way to settle credit 
derivative transactions referencing.43 For example, when Collins & Aikman filed for bankruptcy 
in 2005, there were concerns that there were not enough deliverable bonds to settle all the 
existing index-related contracts.  To address this issue, the ISDA published the first protocols to 
amend the existing contracts for index-related trades to cash settlement from physical settlement 
on a multi-lateral basis, rather than through counterparty to counterparty negotiations, and to 
participate in an auction to determine the cash-settlement price of the defaulted bonds.44 With 
the CDS outstanding greater by multiples than the volume of bonds issued, the bonds would 
have to be bought and sold numerous times in the market to settle the CDS, which would have 
created pressure to source bonds, raising the price of the bonds higher than the likely recovery 
value. Hence, the market developed credit event auctions, first to facilitate cash settlement and 
more recently, to allow for physical settlement on net open positions.45 
 
The protocol mechanism facilitates industry-wide net settlement of CDS referencing an 
insolvent entity. The recent Lehman Brothers Holdings’ auction illustrated that the market can 
price the value of CDS and allow cash settlement for counterparties to CDS trades. The auction 
set a price and resulted in protection sellers paying 91 cents on the dollar to protection buyers.46 
More than 350 organizations adhered to the 2008 Lehman CDS Protocol, which provided a 
settlement procedure for approximately USD 6 billion of net CDS exposures.47 
While these innovations are important, they address only one aspect of the settlement process. 
There continues to be a lack of transparency as to who is bearing the ultimate costs of the 
deficiencies in value when all the CDS settlements are completed. The dealer firms tend to have 
less net exposure as they frequently buy protection to offset the risk of the protection they have 
sold. The same may not be the case for end purchasers. The Financial Services Authority in the 
UK has reported that “there is a risk that the greater complexity facing creditors could, in the 
immediate aftermath of a credit event on a heavily traded security or multiple concurrent 
defaults, lead to disorderly markets for related securities”.48   Any move towards central clearing 
facilities requires a rethinking of how such trading and settlement becomes more transparent to 
parties, so that they can properly assess and price their risk. Moreover, protocols do not resolve 
the issue of strategic behaviour where there is no longer economic interest in a debtor company.  
                                                                   
43
 ISDA Protocols, supra, note 3. 
44
 Nomura, CDS Recovery Basis, ISDA, 2006. 
45




 ISDA 2008 Lehman CDS Protocol, ibid. 
48
 FSA, Financial Risk Outlook 2008, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/plan/financial_risk_outlook_2008.pdf  
at 52-53. 
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Not all issues canvassed above require regulatory intervention; resolution of some issues could 
be contractual. Credit derivatives going forward may involve negotiation of new covenants 
regarding disclosure or insolvency control rights in light of recent market problems.  If 
protection sellers, who bear the risk of default, want a voice in insolvency restructuring 
proceedings, presumably they can contract for acquisition of such rights on a credit event 
through agreeing to physical settlement in the CDS.  However, such contractual protection may 
not be possible once the derivative is resold. In those cases, do cash settled protection sellers 
have any interest in a restructuring proceeding such that they should be recognized in any way 
by the court? Such recognition, if it could be established, poses another set of challenging issues 
for timely and fair insolvency restructuring proceedings and requires further public policy 
debate.49  
 
Some jurisdictions have statutorily created unsecured creditors’ committees, where 
representative creditors have a role in the negotiations for an insolvency workout, paid out of 
the insolvency estate, and such committees often have strong normative sway with the court.50 
In some jurisdictions, courts recognize ad hoc committees of creditors for similar purposes. In 
thinking about the disconnection between economic interest and legal claim, it may be that the 
price for participation on such committees should be that such creditors are required to disclose 
the extent to which their economic risk has been hedged, with the court given authority to refuse 
to let the creditor participate where there is little or no economic interest. 
 
Recommendations at the point of settlement and insolvency restructuring proceedings: 
 
1. There should be mandatory disclosure during a restructuring proceeding of the real 
economic risks at stake, including disclosure of the amount of debt that has been hedged by 
creditors that seek to exercise their voting or oversight rights in a restructuring proceeding.  
Lack of transparency now means that the debtor company and other creditors are not aware 
of who is bearing the real economic risk of firm failure, inhibiting the potential for a viable 
business restructuring plan. 
 
i. The court should be granted authority to determine the scope and timing of disclosure, 
including making determinations in respect of confidentiality, limiting access only to 
parties in the proceeding, and determining any exceptions, such as for de minimus 
holdings.   
 
The outcome sought is greater transparency in respect of the economic interests at risk with the 
company’s insolvency, with the court having authority to limit required disclosure where 
circumstances merit. 
 
2. The court’s consideration of any restructuring plan should take account of economic 
interests at stake.  This weighing of interest could be accomplished in two different ways: 
 
i. Voting on a restructuring plan could be premised on the real economic interests in the 
firm’s insolvency.  Currently, our voting system globally is based on provable claims.  
However, the growth of credit derivatives means that the voting power of financial 
institutions that have partial or full credit default swap coverage may be 
disproportionately large compared with the amount of economic risk, skewing voting 
outcomes and harming the potential for restructuring of an economically viable 
company. This alternative would require some recognition of the rights of cash settled 
swap holders, who are now the residual risk holders. 
 
                                                                   
49
 For example, if it could be established that there was some sort of interest in the proceedings, there 
would remain collective action problems in many cases, and thus there is a question of whether a 
representative agent, not unlike an indenture trustee, could represent the collective interests of cash 
settlement protection sellers. 
50
 See for example,  Rule 2019, US Bankruptcy Code. 
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ii. Alternatively, legal voting rights could be unaffected, but the court could be granted 
authority to weigh actual economic interests when considering parties’ positions and 
exercise of voting rights.  In Canada, this exercise is a balancing of prejudice and 
equities in the proceedings.  In civil law jurisdictions, some codification of both the 
authority and the criteria would have to be enacted.  
 
The outcome sought is to ensure that those parties with real economic interests in the company’s 
insolvency are given the greatest voice in the restructuring proceeding. 
 
3. Amend insolvency restructuring legislation to include credit derivatives associated with 
creditor claims against the debtor company within the mandatory stay of proceedings, 
except with leave of the court on the basis of unfair prejudice, the standard currently used in 
many jurisdictions for other creditors to be exempted from the stay.  The court could then 
exercise oversight of the clearing process in a measured way that assists with the risk 
management aspects of the products and slows the speculative market.   
 
The outcome sought is to allow credit derivatives to continue to settle where they are not 
adversely affecting the workout process, but stayed where the court is persuaded that it would 
prevent inappropriate conduct or would preserve going concern value pending negotiations for a 
restructuring plan. 
 
4. Create timely claims bar dates, so that for CDS with physical settlement, the debtor need 
only bargain with parties as of that date, and not face a continually revolving door of CDS 
settlements that make the negotiating parties a moving target. While some jurisdictions 
have established such dates in proceedings, there is currently no widespread established 
practice or rule in this regard. 
 
The outcome sought is consistency across different jurisdictions in terms of creating clarity and 
finality in the claims process. 
 
5. Create a central clearing facility for multiple credit derivatives, with regulatory oversight 
and transparency.  The facility itself could be privately operated, but financial services 
regulators should have oversight of disclosure and settlement standards. 
 
The outcome sought is a timely, efficient and fair mechanism to settle derivatives at the point of 
insolvency.  
 
These recommendations are first steps towards creation of a fair and sustainable credit 
derivatives market. Their implementation would pave the way for more extensive debate 
regarding reform of the market, so that it advances the broad public policy goals of many 
jurisdictions of effective, fair and sustainable capital markets. 
